Politics and Traditional Values in East Asia
Exploring Four Comparative Values Surveys in East Asia

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Introduction

Many East Asian nations and cities (or city-states) participate in globally diffused values survey project such as the World Values Surveys (WVS), the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), General Social Survey (GSS), or the National Election Studies (NES). Usually these studies all build on profound theoretical deliberations, methodological debates, and participatory decision-making processes. Yet, many if not all of these studies started in Western contexts, in Europe and/or the United States. As Hofstede (2007) warns, this origin may create biases when these surveys are fielded in other than their original Western contexts: "Issues prominent in the researcher's culture but not necessarily relevant to the respondents will be included, and issues crucial in the respondents' culture but not in the researchers' may be overlooked". This working paper aims to take account of these types of biases. It will more closely look into East Asian-origin values surveys such as the Asia Barometer, Asian Barometer, and the East Asian Values Survey, all starting with their first waves in the early years of this new millennium. The rationale is straightforward: do these surveys adopt concepts and indicators that prove to be more appropriate for surveying East Asian publics?

This working paper focuses on concepts and indicators in the political domain.[2] The globally comparative surveys in this domain that cover non-Western, in this case East Asian contexts heavily dwell on concepts and indicators that can be regarded particularly Western. Specifically notions on basic human rights, participatory democracy, democratic institutions and a separate civil society, voluntary and altruistic cooperative relationships, and even generalized trust are included in these surveys. These notions are regarded universal or at least relevant in all nations, Western and non-Western alike, covered by these studies.[3] Many examples exist of scholars who present and celebrate their notions as inevitable futures of those nations 'not yet' willing to acknowledge their importance (see Bauer & Bell, 1999 and Bell 2006 or some fine examples). Vice versa, few scholars focus on where their ideas might be enriched by engaging with ideas and practices from other than Western contexts. A classic example refers to the controversy

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[2] This is the second working paper in a series. The first one covered religious and traditional East Asian values (Vinken, 2006a, see also Vinken2006b). Before that a working paper was compiled that sketch at length the rationale to compare with East Asian theoretical and empirical notions (Vinken, 2007). More working papers will follow in 2007. For now one paper on family values and one on work values are planned. See also Chen et al. (2006) for the importance to review values at the domain-level.

[3] Universalist notions (e.g., a hierarchy of needs, postmaterialism, Big 5 personality traits, rational choice, etc.) claim that concepts have an absolute nature as they are seen as part of the 'basic' human (psychological) condition. Concepts are thus believed to be applicable in any cultural context. Particularist notions (e.g., Japaneseness, relatedness, virtue) imply that concepts depend on the (national, social, cultural) context, are thus unique to contexts and cannot be generalized across cultures. Universalism mimics individualism, as particularism does collectivism. It is beyond the scope of this article to debate these contrasts further here; see Vinken, 2006b, for further details.

over the absolute nature of values underlying human rights. According to Xiao (2005) there are two antagonistic camps in the debate on human rights. The first camp takes the universalistic approach emphasizing this absolute nature of human rights with principles that mimic basic moral codes of humankind meaningful and applicable in all cultures (e.g., Fukuyama, 1995). The second camp is relativistic stressing the contingent nature of human rights and challenging the universality when pointing at standards of morality that are culture-bound (Emmerson, 1995). Typically China is an example of a culture that builds on other priorities and whose inhabitants do not acknowledge the universality of human rights standards. Xiao's analyses of comparative (Western-origin) value survey data (World Values Survey or WVS) show some stereotypes on China are supported (and others not; Xiao, 2005). Economic and social issues are much higher on the agenda than in Western countries, while issues of co-governance, political rights, individual freedom and autonomy are much lower. However, the Chinese public is familiar with the concept of human rights and are able to evaluate society along these lines, beit that the priority of the issue is not high.

Another classic reference and giving some insights in what alternative models are valid in East Asia is the reference to Confucianism and legalism (Bond, 1996; Hofstede & Bond, 1988; Kahn, 1979). This model is perhaps better than an opposing alternative, seen as the filter through which also influences from the West are perceived, worked with, and institutionalized in forms and shapes that may vary strongly from those in the West. Political practices and the way social problems are dealt with carry the logic of Confucian emphases on working for the good of the family, material well-being, and virtue as a key facet of leadership quality. Virtue as a quality may need more explanation (see also Hofstede, 1996). It refers to claims that one is fit for leadership if one display virtuous behaviour, such as persistence, perseverance, devotion and sacrifice (all proven by successfully passing through a competitive civil service examination system), but also tolerance, respect for differences, and an awareness of reciprocal obligations. Morally and intellectually educated, public-spirited elites thus claimed to be most fit for these positions, while common people are not assumed to posses these qualities to begin with. Even when introducing democratic elections the political system seems to keep its character of a system based on rule by a talented and benevolent elite, regardless whether one or more parties are in place.[4]

As Ikeda and Richey (2005: 242) report, this goes hand in hand with 'carte blanche leadership': "leadership based on unconditional and unanimous dependence of the rank and file on their leader... with the general expectation that services will be rendered on their behalf by their leader". Legalism refers to the instalment and the expectation and acceptance of all-encompassing strong state and bureaucratic institutions that are judged on their aptness to address the need of the times. The culture-hypothesis referring to values such as filial piety, loyalty, obedience and respect extended to the relationship between the ruler and the ruled, is, by some, counterbalanced by a political-reality-hypothesis: it is because political rights are curtailed in some countries that the populace of such countries have negative views of the political rights situation (Carlson, 2006). If culture would filter reality no such relationship between rights restrictions and a negative public opinion would be found. Analyzing the Asia Barometer 2003 and 2004 data no evidence at the country-level for the political reality hypothesis is found. It is especially ethnic fractionalization that impacts people's view of political rights (more fragmented societies are more positive). The political rights situation (operationalized along Western lines, one should bear in mind) only has a very modes effect in Asian countries (Carlson, 2006: 331-332). Indicators to check the culture-hypothesis at the country-level are missing. It seems that at the individual level political allegiances with the current regimes are important: those

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[4] Neumann (2002) reports that in Japan, a formal democracy after the end of WWII, voters first take account of personal ties with candidates before looking at the parties they represent (see also below for the personal ties of political elites and support and neighborhood organisations).

satisfied with the political system also evaluate political rights more positively.[5] This refers to Confucian values that promote respect for authority of the ruler and 'carte blanche leadership'. Here we may find a relationship with trust in the political domain, especially with trust in institutions. As Helgesen (2006: 262) argues: "…the East Asian notions is that power is basically a moral phenomenon and can therefore be trusted in the hands of good leader". Ruler and leaders in a Confucian conception should rule by his moral example rather than by law (Lodén, 2006). Legitimacy of rulers and their institutions, in a circular way of thinking, builds on abiding to the 'correct' school of thought or teachings, such as those of Confucius. Trust in institutions of political power (government, parliament, etc.) is believed to go hand in hand, in other words, with carte blanche leadership perspectives and traditional East Asian values.

There are many more issues in the political domain that are believed to be differently perceived in East Asia: the inapplicability of the classic notion of personal and generalized trust (see, e.g., Dekker, 2004; Yamagishi et al., 1994, 1998, 2003; Yoshino, 2002), the counter-evidence for the so-called universal notion that non-hierarchical network capital only will boost political participation (e.g., Ikeda & Huckfeldt, 2001; Ikeda & Richey, 2005; Ikeda et al., 2005), the weak relationship between political conversation and formal political participation (Ikeda, 2006), and the even hard to simply translate idea of a civil society separate from government and business interests (e.g., Alagappa, 2004; Gu Xin, 1998; Mizukami, 1995; Neumann, 2002; Schak & Hudson, 2003; Takao, 2001; Weller, 2005). In this working paper we will not focus on all of these issues, but limit our scope to the notions of carte blanche leadership perspectives and institutional trust. Especially interesting is to see if we can truly find evidence for an interrelationship between the two and between these two and traditional (East Asian or Confucian) values. If the political perspectives are believed to be strongly intertwined we would have to find an effect of these values on the support for carte blanche leadership and institutional trust.

Outline
This working paper focuses on the interrelationships between political and traditional values in surveys that cover the East Asian region. Are there indications for the existence of carte blanche leadership perspectives in this region and how widespread are these perspectives in terms of adherence among people from different social groups and national contexts? Also: are these perspectives, above and beyond these groups and contexts, related to traditional values in the region? How about institutional trust when thinking of these carte blanche leadership perspectives: do the latter perspectives lead to a strong support for key institutions in the diverse societies? In other words, does endorsing carte blanche leadership go hand in hand with displaying high institutional trust? Moreover: is this positive relationship found regardless of social group membership, country of origin and traditional values support? These questions form the lead of this working paper. In the course of answering these questions we will reflect on the adequacy of concepts and indicators used in the surveys from the East Asian region as compared to the Western-origin one (see also the next section).

The approach to answering these questions is stepwise. In a first step we will look at carte blanche leadership perspectives and at institutional trust as a function of basic demographics such as generation membership and education. Generation membership is crucial as it provides data on the effects of being socialized in the highly different historical periods in East Asia. As Thomsen (2006a) shows many East Asian countries since WWII have experienced many different discontinuous moments of change (besides more continuous ones, e.g., the steady upward economic trends). These moments most probably (and according to generation theory, see e.g. Ester et al., 2006, should) have

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[5] Interestingly this refers to the statement 'statisfaction with the democratic system' with respondents from non-democratic countries, such as China or Uzbekistan, displaying similar and sometimes even stronger positive effects of this type of satisfaction on political rights perceptions as those from longstanding democratic countries (India or Japan) (Carlson, 2006: 334).

had an indelible impact on people's desires, beliefs, and values, including those in the political domain. Education is included to check for effects of divergent levels of social and cultural capital, which, in turn, impact the levels of engagement in the political domain, both in terms of values support and actual participation. When considering the relationship of the impact of carte blanche leadership perspectives on institutional trust we will also add generation membership and education. If younger generation membership and/or a higher level of education are of the highest relevance, then the introduction of these characteristics should reduce if not completely replace the effects of, in this case, carte blanche leadership perspectives on institutional trust.

In a second step the nation/city-state from which the respondents derive is included. This information may capture the effects of being socialized in a particular nation/city-state with all its particular cultural traditions, socio-economic state-of-affairs, and institutional and political regime in place, which, in turn, of course affect the way people from these nations/city-states perceive political culture and subsequently the way they act upon these perceptions. Adding this information on top of the previously mentioned demographic variables may add to or again reduce or replace the effects of carte blanche leadership perspectives and/or demographics, allowing for a more refined conclusion on the relative impact of both types of characteristics.

In a final step several sets of traditional values are included in the equation. The same logic applies here: perhaps traditional values may weaken the effects of carte blanche leadership perspectives, demographics or nation/city-state of origin, and if so, inform us on the extent to which these perspectives and institutional trust are much more (or also) a matter of culture. In this case, carte blanche leadership perspectives are not so much a result of one's formative period or attained educational level or of the country's traditions, state-of-affairs and regime conditions, but much more a matter of the basic values people in East Asia adhere to. Checking this in the stepwise way presented here, sheds a first light on the culture-hypothesis presented above. Maybe especially culture beyond and over other realities that discern nations and city-states in East Asia (compare the political reality hypothesis above) is what makes carte blanche leadership perspectives and institutional trust vary across East Asia. Being part of an East Asian community of specific traditional values, so theory in its extreme logical consequence would go, overrides all other facets determining perspectives on political leadership and institutions. This working paper aims to seek evidence for this logic in recent survey sources from East Asia.

Data, indicators, and the issue of wording
Use is made of several datasets covering different nations and major cities in East Asia. In most cases nations such as China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and/or (the city-state of) Singapore are included. In some cases several large Chinese cities, instead of one overall reference to China, are distinguished. Most of these datasets originate from East Asia, such as the Asia Barometer (AB) of 2003 (see Inoguchi et al., 2005), the Asian Barometer (AnB) covering the 2001-2003 period, and the East Asia Values Survey (EAVS) 2002-2004. For reasons of comparison we have also included the last publicly available wave (2000-2002) of the predominantly Western-origin World Values Survey (WVS).

Crucial for evaluating the analyses results is the issue of concept equivalence. It is relevant therefore to first take a closer look at the question wording. One particular statement in AB candidates as a measurement for carte blanche leadership perspectives. The set of statements from which this one derives is almost similar to the one included in WVS. Yet, some crucial re-phrasings have been made. The question goes: "I'm going to describe various types of political systems. Please indicate for each system whether you think it would be very good, fairly good or bad for this country". One has the choice between: "A) governance by a powerful leader without the restriction of parliament or elections; B) a system whereby decisions affecting the country are made by experts (such as bureaucrats with expertise in a particular field) according to what they think is best for the country; C) military government; and D) a democratic political system".

Statement B is the best candidate. Statement A seems to refer to single-headed dictatorship system that is not per se build on decision-making by (senior, benevolent) experts as is meant with carte blanche leadership in a Confucian sense. Statement B comes closest to this idea. The low correlation (Pearson's r=0,14) between statements A and B seems to corroborate that each statement refers to a highly different concept. In WVS the phrasing of statement B is slightly but crucially different. The introductory question is: "I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country". The item comparable to statement B goes: "Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country". The item in AB refers to bureaucrats or civil servants and government officials when specifying experts and expert rule. In WVS this Confucian perspective on experts is lacking and expert rule is seen as a trade-off with government rule. Experts themselves are not specified in WVS. In AnB, a survey that is specifically build to tap political beliefs, values and behaviours in East Asia, carte blanche leadership perspectives can be measured with several items.[6] One component consisting of the following items emerged (in order of importance c.q. factor loadings): "government leaders are like the head of a family; we should follow their decisions", "the government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed in society", "when judges decide important cases, they should accept the view of the executive branch", "if we have political leaders who are morally upright, we let them decide everything", "we should get rid of parliament and elections and have the experts decide everything", and the sixth and last item "if the government is constantly checked [i.e. monitored and supervised] by the legislature, it cannot possibly accomplish great things". Finally, in EAVS only the next question qualifies for the measurement of carte blanche leadership perspectives: "Some people say that if we get outstanding political leaders, the best way to improve the country is for the people to leave everything to them, rather than for the people to discuss things among themselves". Similar to AB and AnB there is a Confucian reference in EAVS to the professional status, achievements or expertise of leaders in the political realm who can thus be trusted to accomplish what is best for a society.

Institutional trust as a concept is limited to two institutions only: national government and parliament. These two are the only two in the list of institutions in AB that are comparable with the ones asked in the other surveys. In AB the items are "central government" and "parliament". In AnB this is "national government" and "parliament". In EAVS it is "national government" and "national assembly (diet or parliament)" and in WVS "the government in [your capital]" and "parliament".

Before going to the values concepts, let us first take a short look at the position of the nations/city-states on the concepts of carte blanche leadership perspectives and institutional trust. Table 1 provides the details

Table 1 about here

Indeed, the wording of the items measuring carte blanche leadership perspectives seems to matter. In the East Asian-origin surveys Japan, for instance, is the least supportive towards these perspectives. In the Western-origin surveys WVS it is the most supportive. Vice versa, in the East Asian-origin surveys China is most and in the Western-origin survey least supportive. It is relevant that the East Asian-origin surveys do not regard expert rule as an antithesis of government rule. Once this opposition is introduced, the Japanese seem to favour expert rule and the Chinese do so less. Is the opposition absent, then the Chinese are most supportive unlike especially the Japanese. Taking a closer look, now including the data on the strength of the association (the Eta^2), it is clear that the items of WVS, followed by those of EAVS and also AB, are less capable of making strong distinctions between the East Asian nations. The best indication of carte

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[6] PCA resulted in a one factor solution with Eigen 2,308, R^2 38,5%, and Cronbach's alpha of the sum of scores of 0,676 (no improvement if items deleted).

blanche leadership perspectives in terms of power of discernment is provided by AnB building on a multi-item component. Taking this component into account the Japanese are evidently least in favour of carte blanche leadership perspectives and the Chinese the most, with neutral positions of the Hong Kong, South Korean and Taiwanese publics.

As regards institutional trust, all surveys do a good job of discerning East Asian nations. What is more, the similarity of distinctions is quite striking. Trust is moderate and compared to some nations relatively low in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. It is high to very high in China and most of its cities (including Hong Kong).[7] Again the best in terms of discernment is the AnB survey.

In each survey several measurements for <u>traditional</u> (East Asian) <u>values</u> are in use. In AB, a survey far from focused on values as such, several items refer to desired accomplishments of (if necessary, imagined) sons and daughters: from becoming wealthy to becoming a person who cares about family. No reliable factor or sum of scores could be constructed, not for sons or for daughters.[8] Intercorrelations between the different desires are quite low. Two series of counts were included for sons and for daughters separately. One count refers to <u>fame</u>: become a great scholar, a powerful political leader, very wealthy, a person respected by the masses. The other refers to <u>relatedness</u>: become a loving and charitable person, become a person who cares about family, and find a good marriage partner. In AnB a two-factor values structure was successfully established on a series of items. The first factor refers to <u>preservation</u> with items such as 'a man will loose face if he works under a female supervisor', 'wealth and poverty, success and failure are all determined by fate', and 'when hiring someone, even if a stranger is more qualified, the opportunity should still be given to relatives and friends'.[9] The second factor seems to relate to <u>harmony</u>, with, e.g., 'for the sake of the family, the individual should put his personal interest second', 'a person should not insist on his own opinion, if his co-workers disagree with him', and 'when one has a conflict with a neighbor, the best way to deal with it is to accommodate the other person'.[10] The items of both factors do not form strongly reliable sum of scores scales. EAVS has a specific set of traditional Asian values and analyses result in a two-factor solution. The first factor is strong and is labelled <u>gender roles</u> with items such as 'we need a son to keep our family line going', 'a wife should follow her husband', 'men should work outside and women should tend to housekeeping'.[11] The second factor consists of only two strongly loading items: 'we should respect ancestors' and 'the eldest son should look after his aging parents'.[12] The factor is labelled <u>respect ancestors</u>.[13] In WVS the choice of values is abundant, but in order to align with the previous a focus was put on several items that tap respect for parents, the need for children, and gender roles. Two factors emerged.[14] The first factor directs items such as 'a working mother can establish just as

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[7] See for comparable levels of trust Helgesen and Thomsen (2006) reporting on a survey project that includes East Asian and Scandinavian countries. See more particularly Thomsen (2006b). See also Inglehart (1997).

[8] This could be the result of asking respondents to nominate two desires to the maximum and the resulting mentioned-not-mentioned format, which does not facilitate factor analysis.

[9] This factor (after PCA, varimax rotation) has an Eigen of 1,984, R^2 20,6%, and Cronbach's alpha of sum of scores 0,513. Items responses are reversed: strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, somewhat agree and strongly agree.

[10] Eigen 1,238, R^2 19,7%, Cronbach's alpha of sum of scores 0,463. Item responses reversed into strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree.

[11] This factor (after PCA, varimax rotation) with Eigen 2,740, R^2 35,9%.

[12] Eigen 1,141, R^2 19,4%.

[13] Respectively Cronbach's alpha of sum of scores 0,751 and correlation 'respect ancestors'-items of 0,27.

[14] Factor analyses (PCA, varimax rotation) show two factors with respectively Eigen 1,486 and 1,200, R^2 24,5% and 20,3% and (very weak) Cronbach's alpha's of sums of scores 0,340 and 0,452. Items are recoded in what is believed the traditional direction. 'Always respect parents' and 'women need children' are 0-1 format (respondent could choose these statements or alternatives). The items 'main goal make parents proud', and

warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work', 'being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay', and 'both the husband and wife should contribute to household income'. This factor is labelled <u>gender roles</u>. The second factor, labelled <u>piety</u>, includes: 'one of my main goals in life has been to make my parents proud', 'a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled', and 'regardless of what the qualities and faults of one's parents are, one must always love and respect them'.
Table 2 reports on the values positions of the nations and city-states.

Table 2 about here

The strongest diversity is found in the WVS piety and EAVS gender roles instruments (considering the Eta^2): The Chinese disagree most with both of these traditional values. While the Japanese also denounce piety they are neutral like also the Hong Kong Chinese as regards traditional gender roles. The Singaporeans (also predominantly of Chinese origin), South Koreans, and Taiwanese are traditional as regards both values. In terms of discerning power the WVS gender roles instrument is weak, as are both AnB preservation and harmony instruments.[15] All included nations take up a neutral position on these values. The EAVS respect for ancestor and all AB values instruments are relatively good. Respect for ancestors is valued most in Taiwan, Hong Kong and many other Chinese cities. In especially Japan and South Korea this value has low priority. Fame for both sons and daughters is valued more in China and South Korea than in Japan. Relatedness of sons and especially daughters is high priority in Japan followed at some distance by South Korea and China.

Two socio-demographic variables are, finally, included in the analyses: generation membership and education. The three-fold <u>generation membership</u> variable refers to cohorts born before 1945, between 1945 and 1969, and in 1970 or later. In most cases (compare Thomsen, 2006a) this division distinguishes cohorts whose members 1) experienced the gravity of war and early post-war re-construction in their youthful or formative years (the pre-1945 cohort), 2) years of rapidly advancing socio-economic development and at the same time severe cultural upheaval as well as, by the end of the 1960s, rising affluence (all except China; the 1945-1969 cohort), or 3) years of relative stability and more broadly felt affluence (post 1970-cohort). The <u>education</u> variable is a three-level ranked indicator (low, middle, high) build on differently ranged variables tapping scores from non-finalized primary education to finalized university education.

Carte Blanche Leadership Perspectives
As stated, the relationship of carte blanche leadership perspectives with traditional values is surveyed in several steps: traditional values are added in a final step after, first, the inclusion of demographics and, second, information of the country/city-state origin. This order of steps, of course, makes it hard for the set of traditional values to contribute to the explanation of the diversity of perspectives on carte blanche leadership. Yet, it is an opportune way to check the added-value of traditional values in this case. Table 3 reports.

'housewife just as fulfilling as working wife' are recoded in disagree strongly to agree strongly; 'working mother can have warm relationship child' and 'both men and women contribute to household income' are not recoded and therefore here still range from agree strongly to disagree strongly. The 'housewife fulfilling'-item now loaded negatively on the factor with the these two non-recoded items in this factor, meaning: the higher the score on this factor, the more one disagrees with 'housewife fulfilling'-item, and the more one disagrees with the two non-recoded items mentioned. The rationale of the recode of the 'housewife fulfilling'-item seems incorrect: it is not per se traditional to think that being a housewife is just as fulfilling as being a working wife. The housewife fulfilling-item therefore was used in its original non-recoded format. See also Braun (2006) for more methodological problems with these gender role items.

[15] The rule of thumb is that an instrument is weak in terms of this power with Eta^2 <0,05 comparable to a correlation of < 0,25.

Table 3 about here

Starting with the conclusion it is found that information on the nation and city-state of origin is most informative for the explanation of carte blanche leadership perspectives as are in one case traditional values. In most surveys demographics hardly matter. The exception is AnB which first points out that younger generations and the lower educated are more in favour of carte blanche leadership. Yet, including nation/city information, reduces the impact of generation membership to insignificance. The education effect also diminishes, but still remains significant. In almost all surveys a grand leap in explanatory power is attained after introducing information of nation and city of origin. The results of the univariate analyses (see Table 1) are reflected in these findings: especially the Chinese but also publics from the other nations and cities are more inclined to support carte blanche leadership than the Japanese do. Only in the case of the AnB survey (the one with the most discerning carte blanche leadership perspectives instrument) we see a rather impressive contribution of traditional values: effects of education and country/city of origin weaken, yet remain in tact, and now also those who support traditional values such as preservation and harmony endorse carte blanche leadership perspectives. The analyses finally show that the WVS survey is particularly weak in explaining (and, as we saw earlier, in tapping) carte blanche leadership perspectives. The AnB survey with its distinctive concepts and indicators is best by far.

Interestingly, the analyses do not unequivocally allow one to conclude that either a political reality or culture hypothesis underpins the perspectives on carte blanche leadership. The processes described in both hypotheses both seem relevant. In countries with diverging degrees of autocratic rule, even in relatively young democracies such as South Korea and Taiwan, publics have limited opportunities and sometimes simply limited rights to participate in political decision-making. In these countries, in line with the political reality hypothesis, carte blanche leadership perspectives are endorsed most. The exception perhaps is Hong Kong whose public also supports these perspectives more strongly than the Japanese do, but whose inhabitants display a relatively low level of support compared to other (Chinese-origin) nationals. In Hong Kong, a Special Administrative Region of China, not only a section of the general public but also an election committee of high-status people from business and professional sectors have the say in who runs the city-state. In Hong Kong there is, however, a strong tradition of fierce protesting, criticism, and debate on civic freedoms and their limitations after the hand-over to China. This political reality might also feed the relatively moderate endorsement of carte leadership perspectives in Hong Kong. The political reality hypothesis is at work, yet the culture hypothesis can not be rejected either. Confucian-origin values such as preservation and harmony induce acceptance of unequal relationships (as long as they are mutually beneficial), conflict-avoidance, and conformity with (benevolent) rulers. These values are equally important as the country or city of origin when explaining carte blanche leadership perspectives. Values, interestingly, that are not tapped in any of the globally diffused and Western-origin values surveys.

Institutional Trust
Again in several steps, the same ones as above, but now preceded by the step that includes carte blanche leadership perspectives, the relationship between institutional trust and traditional values is surveyed. Table 4 shows all details.

Table 4 about here

Again presenting the most important finding first: information on the nation and city of origin is now the predominant and sole factor in explaining institutional trust, here refrained to trust in national government and parliament. Consistently, also in the more weak surveys (in terms of concepts and indicators), the Chinese are trusting institutions most and the South Koreans least (all as compared to the Japanese). Very modest, but

also consistent is the higher level of trust among those endorsing carte blanche leadership perspectives and the somewhat lower level of trust among younger cohorts. Educational levels are not very important compared to the other features mentioned. The same goes for traditional (East Asian) values. Some of these values do contribute to trust, but when taking account of the amount these values contribute to trust these values are of limited importance. It is sufficient to know one's nation or city of origin and perhaps also one's stance on carte blanche leadership perspectives and one's generation membership. Especially when operationalized in the way AnB does carte blanche leadership perspectives seem to have some impact, beit an impact that lags far behind the effect of nation/city information. The younger generations are consistently yet very moderately distinguishable in terms of trust. All in all, the conclusion seems justified that it is the political reality hypothesis and not the culture hypothesis that is valid for explaining divergent levels of institutional trust in East Asia. Now we know culture is only of little relevance, the challenge ahead is, of course, to determine what exactly in the political realities of East Asia make people vary in terms of institutional trust.

Conclusions
When measured in a multidimensional way, as is found in the Asian Barometer (AnB), there are indications for the existence of carte blanche leadership perspectives in the East Asian region, with Japan least and China (and particular cities in China) most supportive towards these perspectives. This information on the national or city origin of publics, a proxy for the diversity in national (and city-level) traditions, socio-economic state-of-affairs, and institutional and political regimes, is one of two most important factors. The other one relates to traditional values: emphases on preservation and harmony strongly relate to carte blanche leadership perspectives. The effects of these values and the proxy of national (and city-level) diversity indicate that both a so-called culture hypothesis and political reality hypothesis seem at work. Confucian-origin values seem to induce acceptance of unequal relationships, conflict-avoidance, and conformity with expert rulers underpinning carte blanche leadership (culture hypothesis). Also, nations (and cities within these nations or city-states, such as Singapore) with limited opportunities and sometimes even limited rights to participate in the political process are likely to endorse carte blanche leadership perspectives (political reality hypothesis).

The information on the national or city origin of publics is by far the most important factor explaining institutional trust, here trust in national government and parliament. The Chinese are trusting institutions most and the South Koreans least, all as compared to Japan. Carte blanche leadership perspectives have limited importance as far as institutional trust goes (the best positive effects, beit modest, are found when these perspectives are operationalized in a broad way as in AnB) and the same is true for traditional East Asian values. The political reality hypothesis presented above seems the sole factor contributing to trust in government and parliament. As information on national and city origin is a proxy of a broad range of states-of-affairs and processes discerning nations and cities, such as political reality, there is a task ahead to specify these states and processes more clearly. For instance, by introducing data on GNP or economic growth or data on trends in political and civil liberties or other macro-level data. At the same time technical difficulties have to be overcome when doing so: the low number of nations and cities makes a specification along these lines and a macro-level analysis a less attractive option.

What is clear is that especially the Western-origin survey, the World Values Survey (WVS), or the East Asian-origin ones, such as the Asia Barometer (AB), copying concepts and indicators from Western-origin ones, are inadequate to tap political realities in East Asia, including political concepts realistic for East Asian publics. The questions asked in Western surveys sometimes result in a completely reversed order of publics prioritizing certain political values and perspectives as compared to East Asian-origin values surveys. This is especially the case when expert rule is seen as an antagonism of government rule. This oppositional zero-sum perspective is unrealistic in the East Asian context. Also, the impact of values as defined by Western-origin surveys is weak and

easily leading to the false conclusion that values hardly matter in the political realm in East Asia. More effort to include values that reflect on the specific past of the region is called for if one aims to explain preferences and practices with basic values. As stated earlier (Vinken, 2007) the analyses of a multitude of surveys about one region raises question about concept equivalence and the need for congruence. Both as regards carte blanche leadership perspectives and basic values the surveys presented here sometimes strongly diverge. Especially as regards the traditional East Asian values, there is serious disparity about what values stand out as the ultimate key values relevant for the vast publics of East Asia. The analyses above prove that using a multiple indicators on political and values perspectives is most fruitful. It is therefore not only necessary for globally diffused Western-origin surveys to learn from East Asian ones, but also for the latter ones to learn from each other.

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Tables

Table 1: Carte Blanche Leadership Perspectives and Institutional Trust

Carte Blanche Leadership Perspectives	AB 2003	AnB 2001-2003	EAVS 2002-2004	WVS 2000-2002
China	2,08	0,43	-	2,29
- Beijing	-	-	2,02	-
- Shanghai	-	-	1,91	-
- Hong Kong	-	0,07	1,91	-
- Kunming	-	-	2,10	-
- Hangzhou	-	-	1,93	-
Japan	1,77	-0,89	1,51	2,52
Singapore	-	-	1,91	2,29
South Korea	2,00	0,09	1,84	2,48
Taiwan	-	-0,03	2,00	-
Eta^2	0,05	0,19	0,03	0,02
Institutional Trust	AB 2003	AnB 2001-2003	EAVS 2002-2004	WVS 2000-2002
China	3,23	3,63	-	3,32
- Beijing	-	-	3,24	-
- Shanghai	-	-	3,37	-
- Hong Kong	-	2,60	2,61	-
- Kunming	-	-	3,04	-
- Hangzhou	-	-	3,20	-
Japan	1,87	2,02	2,32	2,06
Singapore	-	-	3,25	*
South Korea	1,86	1,93	1,95	1,96
Taiwan	-	2,18	2,27	-
Eta^2	0,55	0,67	0,36	0,49

Sources: AB = Asia Barometer; AnB = Asian Barometer; EAVS = East Asia Values Survey; WVS = World Values Survey. NB: - = no data; * = not asked in Singapore. Carte Blanche Leadership Perspectives for AB and WVS are means of 1) Bad, 2) Fairly good, 3) Very good; For AnB factor scores from -1,00 to +1,00 based on responses 1) Disagree, 2) Somewhat disagree, 3) Somewhat agree, 4) Strongly agree; For EAVS means of 1) Disagree, 2) Undecided/it depends, 3) Agree; Institutional Trust for AB are means of 1) Don't trust at all, 2) Don't really trust, 3) Trust to a degree, 4) Trust a lot; For AnB means of 1) Not at all, 2) Not very much, 3) Quite a lot, 4) A great deal; For EAVS means of 1) Not confident at all, 2) not confident, 30 somewhat confident, 4) very confident; For WVS means of 1) Don't trust at all, 2) Don't really trust, 3) Trust to a degree; 4) Trust a lot.

Table 2: Traditional (East Asian) values

	AB 2003				AnB 2001-2003		EAVS 2002-2004		WVS 2000-2002	
	fame son	fame daughter	relatedness son	relatedness daughter	preser-vation	harmony	gender roles	respect ancestors	gender roles	piety
China	0,82	0,52	0,73	1,11	0,11	0,08	-	-	-0,18	-0,44
- Beijing	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0,40	0,03	-	-
- Shanghai	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0,48	0,19	-	-
- Hong Kong	-	-	-	-	0,19	-0,20	-0,04	0,30	-	-
- Kunming	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0,29	-0,03	-	-
- Hangzhou	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0,29	0,13	-	-
Japan	0,35	0,15	1,28	1,56	-0,29	0,11	0,07	-0,42	0,05	-0,67
Singapore	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,49	-0,07	0,24	0,41
South Korea	0,70	0,34	0,92	1,40	0,03	-0,08	0,59	-0,47	-0,20	0,22
Taiwan	-	-	-	-	-0,14	-0,05	0,50	0,29	-	-
Eta^2	0,10	0,09	0,11	0,07	0,02	0,01	0,16	0,07	0,04	0,19

Sources: AB = Asia Barometer; AnB = Asian Barometer; EAVS = East Asia Values Survey; WVS = World Values Survey. NB: - = no data; For AB means of maximum of two mentions of selected items (range 0-2); For AnB, EAVS and WVS piety factors scores from -1,00 to +1,00 based on responses 1) Strongly disagree, 2) Somewhat disagree, 3) Somewhat agree, and 4) Strongly agree; For WVS gender roles idem based on responses 1) Strongly agree, 2) Somewhat agree, 3) Somewhat disagree, and 4) Strongly disagree.

Table 3: Carte Blanche Leadership Perspectives

Beta's	AB 2003	AnB 2001-2003	EAVS 2002-2004	WVS 2000-2002
Cohort 1945-1970	rc	,060 **	-,037*	,073**
Cohort 1970+	,038	,070***	-,067***	,092**
Education	-,049 *	-,301***	-,088***	,094***
R²	,002	,083	,014	,013
Cohort 1945-1970	rc	-,013	-,054***	,075***
Cohort 1970+	,021	-,020	-,098***	,095***
Education	-,018	-,214***	-,076***	,071***
China	,236***	,519***	-	-,031
- Beijing	-	-	,211***	-
- Shanghai	-	-	,152***	-
- Hong Kong	-	,231***	,162***	-
- Kunming	-	-	,213***	-
- Hangzhou	-	-	,145***	-
Singapore	-	-	,151***	-
South Korea	,180***	,418***	,137***	,049**
Taiwan	-	,303***	,158***	-
R²	,048***	,205***	,042***	,017**
Cohort 1945-1970	rc	,017	-,046**	,081**
Cohort 1970+	,022	,038***	-,085***	,104***
Education	-,017	-,138***	-,066***	,055**
China	,221***	,493***	-	-,054**
- Beijing	-	-	,219***	-
- Shanghai	-	-	,162***	-
- Hong Kong	-	,220***	,163***	-
- Kunming	-	-	,219***	-
- Hangzhou	-	-	,150***	-
Singapore	-	-	,140***	-
South Korea	,169***	,386***	,125***	-,048*
Taiwan	-	,307***	,148***	-
Son Fame	,034	-	-	-
Daughter Fame	,017	-	-	-
Son Relatedness	,005	-	-	-
Daughter Relatedness	-,005	-	-	-
Preservation	-	,294***	-	-
Harmony	-	,214***	-	-
Respect Ancestors	-	-	,008	-
Gender Roles	-	-	,068***	-,058**
Piety	-	-	-	-,064***
R²	,048	,324***	,045***	,024***

Sources: AB = Asia Barometer; AnB = Asian Barometer; EAVS = East Asia Values Survey; WVS = World Values Survey. NB: Multiple linear regression with, if not stated otherwise, Japan and cohort pre-1945 as reference categories; - = no data; rc = reference category; R^2 = Adjusted R^2 (checked for significance of F change); *** = p <.001; ** = p<.01; * = p<.05.

Table 4: Institutional Trust

Beta's	AB 2003	AnB 2001-2003	EAVS 2002-2004	WVS 2000-2002
CBLP	,161***	,304***	,080***	-,158***
R^2	,026	,093	,006	,025
CBLP	,155***	,244***	,073***	-,134***
Cohort 1945-1970	rc	,058**	-,066***	,047
Cohort 1970+	-,014	,043*	-,030	,056
Education	-,156***	-,216***	-,055***	-,331***
R^2	,050***	,133***	,012***	,131***
CBLP	,053***	,097***	,029**	-,048**
Cohort 1945-1970	rc	-,043**	-,057***	-,141***
Cohort 1970+	-,032*	-,039**	-,033*	-,172***
Education	-,005	-,024*	-,069**	-,029
China	,724***	,753***	-	,682***
- Beijing	-	-	,371***	-
- Shanghai	-	-	,442***	-
- Hong Kong	-	,170***	,105***	-
- Kunming	-	-	,252***	-
- Hangzhou	-	-	,303***	-
Singapore	-	-	,345***	-
South Korea	-,012	-,071***	-,154***	-,020
Taiwan	-	,039**	-,027*	-
R^2	,549***	,645***	,375***	,502**
CBLP	,052***	,069***	,026**	-,050**
Cohort 1945-1970	rc	-,040**	-,044**	-,123***
Cohort 1970+	-,033*	-,032****	-,019	-,149***
Education	-,004	-,016	-,061*	-,022
China	,725***	,759***	-	,665**
- Beijing	-	-	,361***	-
- Shanghai	-	-	,408***	-
- Hong Kong	-	,169***	,084***	-
- Kunming	-	-	,244***	-
- Hangzhou	-	-	,291***	-
Singapore	-	-	,329***	-
South Korea	-,014	-,070***	-,160***	-,070**
Taiwan	-	,046***	-,050***	-
Son Fame	,016	-	-	-
Daughter Fame	,000	-	-	-
Son Relatedness	,015	-	-	-
Daughter Relatedness	,016	-	-	-
Preservation	-	,074***	-	-
Harmony	-	,013	-	-
Respect Ancestors	-	-	,097***	-
Gender Roles	-	-	,037***	-,033*
Piety	-	-	-	,085***
R^2	,549	,650***	,385***	,510***

Sources: AB = Asia Barometer; AnB = Asian Barometer; EAVS = East Asia Values Survey; WVS = World Values Survey. NB: CBLP = Carte Blanche Leadership Perspective; Multiple linear regression with, if not stated otherwise, Japan and cohort pre-1945 as reference categories; - = no data; rc = reference category; R^2 = Adjusted R^2 (checked for significance of F change); *** = p <.001; ** = p<.01; * = p<.05.